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Abstract
A general feature of national fiscal systems is that they provide buffers against regional
fluctuations in output and employment by redistributing income between the different regions of
a country. Recent literature in connection with European monetary integration has stressed the
insurance aspect of this function: Through the fiscal system, regions obtain insurance against
asymmetric shocks. In this paper, we review the literature on risk-sharing through fiscal
mechanisms. While consumption smoothing would call for full risk-sharing among regions,
moral hazard problems, political economy problems and considerations of macro economic
stabilization reduce the optimal degree of risk sharing. This may explain why empirical research
generally finds that intranational risk-sharing based on fiscal policy seems rather modest. 1
I. Introduction
A fundamental feature of the modern state is to provide risk-sharing arrangements for its
citizens. In this paper, we focus on the state as a provider of intranational risk-sharing, defined as
sharing income risk among the inhabitants of the different regions of a state. State-provided
intranational risk-sharing occurs, when a nation’s fiscal system redistributes income across regions
in response to unforeseen economic developments. This can take a variety of forms in practice.
Often, it is simply a by-product of general welfare and tax-transfer systems. In some federal states,
e.g., Australia, Germany, and Canada, intranational risksharing is provided by fiscal mechanisms
designed for the horizontal redistribution of income among subcentral governments. In the US and
elsewhere,  intranational risksharing is the product of budgetary transfers from the central
government to regional or local governments. Such mechanisms are generally based on equity
considerations: Protecting the individual against economic hardship is part of the solidarity defining
a society.  As Delors (1989, p. 89) puts it in his plea for a fiscal risksharing mechanism among the
members of the European Monetary Union (EMU), 
“... in all federations the different combinations of federal budgetary mechanisms have powerful
“shock-absorber” effects dampening the amplitude either of economic difficulties or of surges in
prosperity of individual states. This is both the product of, and the source of the sense of national
solidarity which all relevant economic and monetary unions share.” 
Furthermore, intranational risk-sharing has an obvious aspect of intranational economic
stabilization. Channeling income from prospering regions to regions in distress can help attenuate
asymmetries in the cyclical fluctuations of different regions belonging to the same country and
produce a more even economic development across all regions. This aspect has gained particular
attention in the context of EMU in the past 25 years. Starting with the MacDougall Report
(European Commission, 1977), many economists have argued that a viable EMU requires a fiscal
transfer mechanism to deal effectively with “asymmetric” shocks, i.e., economic disturbances that
affect its different regions in different ways. More recently, Sachs and Sala-i-Martin (1992) claim
that a successful EMU must be vested with instruments for regional redistribution comparable to
those existing in the US.  Although their empirical analysis has been the subject of a large debate,
the basic argument, that the loss of the exchange rate channel for adjustment to asymmetric2
shocks must be compensated by an appropriate fiscal policy tool to avoid large and protracted
regional swings in economic growth and unemployment has received wide acceptance (e.g.
Wyplosz, 1991; Frenkel and Goldstein, 1991, Pisani–Ferry et al, 1993).
Section II of this paper discusses the principles of intranational risksharing, including the
moral hazard problems involved and some aspects of political economy. Section III reviews the
empirical evidence of intranational risksharing provided by fiscal mechanisms in the US and other
countries. In contrast to the general acceptance of the claim that viable monetary unions need such
mechanisms, the empirical literature suggests that fiscal policy contributes relatively little to the
stabilization of asymmetric in most federal systems. Section IV develops an argument to resolve
that puzzle. We show that regional asymmetries in the propagation mechanisms of fiscal and
monetary policy may lead to a conflict between stabilizing regional income fluctuations around
average national income and stabilizing regional incomes over time, and a conflict between
stabilizing asymmetric shocks and stabilizing aggregate shocks at the national level. If such
asymmetries are large, large-scale fiscal mechanisms for intranational risksharing may not be
desirable.  
II. Principles of Intranational Risk-sharing
Economists have approached intranational risk-sharing from two ends. One strand of the
literature considers risksharing among consumers inhabiting different regions as a special case of
consumption smoothing (e.g. Asdrubali et al, 1996; Atkeson and Bayoumi, 1993; van Wincorp,
1995; Athanasoulis and van Wincorp, 1998). The basic question is, to what extent consumers of
a given country are able to diversify regional risk. The other strand of the literature starts from
optimum-currency area considerations and regards intranational transfer mechanisms as an
alternative to flexible exchange rates and other market mechanisms for regional economic
stabilization of output and employment (e.g., Mundell, 1961; Kenen, 1969; Wyplosz, 1991;
Goodhart and Smith 1993; von Hagen and Hammond, 1998).
  1Asdrubali et al (1996) distinguish between capital markets and credit markets.
While this distinction is useful in their analysis for statistical reasons, we use the term
“capital markets” in the common, more general sense of financial markets.
2 There is an obvious analogy here with models of international risk sharing tested in
the context of tests of international capital mobility, e.g. Backus et al. (1992).
3See Fatas (1998) for a similar exposition.











In a world of complete capital markets, all risk-sharing would be provided by capital
markets.
1 Consumers would insure themselves against region-specific shocks by holding portfolios
that pay higher returns when their incomes out of economic activities in their own region are low.
As a result, consumption would be highly correlated across regions, and interregional consumption
correlations would be stronger than interregional income correlations.
2 
When capital markets are incomplete, however, consumption smoothing can be provided
by fiscal transfers of income across regions. Consider a country composed i = 1, ..., n regions.
3 The
representative consumer in each region receives an income yit, which is  a random variable with
expectation yoi and a fixed variance. We abstract from private sector saving, for simplicity.
4 Thus,
in the absence of a central government fiscal policy the representative consumer’s budget
constraint in each region is cit = yit. 
If the representative consumers are risk averse, a central government can make them better
off by using fiscal policy to pool income risk across the regions. Assume that the central
government can  employ three types of instruments for this purpose, a set of state-independent
taxes Joi, state dependent-taxes Ji (yi), and state-dependent transfers gi(yi). Assume, further, that
inter-regional equity considerations constrain tax policies such that the marginal income tax rate









Finally, let the transfers paid to all regions be the same, git = J (yt - y0), where yt denotes average
national income and y0 its expected value. The consumer’s budget constraint then is cit = (1-J)(yit-
yi0)+J(yt - y0) - Ji0 .
Consider, first, the case of purely state-dependent taxes and transfers, so that fiscal policy
has no element of pure redistribution. Optimal intranational risk-sharing is obtained by choosing J
minimizing the variance of consumption, cit . For region i, the optimal tax rate is 
Here, Di is the correlation between region i’s income and the country’s average income. 
Equation (2) bears a number of insights. Region i’s optimal tax rate depends on the
correlation of its income with the country’s average income, and on the relative variance of its
income compared to average income. If all shocks are uncorrelated and identically distributed,
optimal intranational insurance amounts to full equalization of all stochastic incomes, cit = yio + (yt.-
y0). More generally, however, this is not true. For high-risk regions (wi > 1), the optimal tax rate
increases with the correlation of its income with average income. For Di < 2wi/(1+wi
2) , the optimal
tax rate increases as the variance ratio inceases, i.e., high-risk regions desire more insurance. In
general, regions with with different risk characteristics desire different tax rates. 
Thus, a single state-contingent tax rate that is optimal for all regions cannot be chosen. To
make consumers in all regions agree on the same rate, the central government can use the state-
independent taxes to implement side payments between regions, compensating those that are
further off from their welfare maximizing tax rate (Persson and Tabellini, 1996b). In such a scenario,
high-risk regions would pay a risk premium to low-risk regions to compensate the latter for providing
more insurance that they would themselves desire.
II.2. Regional Stabilization
The other approach to intraregional risk-sharing derives from the theory of optimum5 Hochreiter and Winckler (1995) present empirical evidence suggesting that real
wage flexibility increased under the “hard” peg of the Austrian Schilling to the DM.
Nevertheless, the role of price and wage flexibility in adjusting to regional shocks seems
very limited in practice as  Obstfeld and Peri (1998) for the US, Canada and European
countries. 
6The importance of labor mobility for the operation of a common currency was first
stressed by Mundell (1961).
5
currency areas (Kenen, 1969; Mundell, 1961) and considers the consequences of  losing the
exchange rate channel of adjustment to asymmetric shocks between regions sharing the same
currency for the stability of these regional economies (e.g. Wyplosz, 1991; Goodhart and Smith
1993; von Hagen and Hammond, 1998). The macro economic perspective brings a broader range
of alternative adjustment mechanisms into the picture. Apart from capital markets, these are wage
and price adjustment to regional shocks and migration of labor between regions. Ingram (1959) first
noted the potential usefulness of interregional fiscal transfers to achieve a greater degree of
regional income and employment stability, if market mechanisms do not provide sufficient regional
stabilization. The macroeconomic perspective allows to consider fiscal transfers paid to regional
governments instead of individual consumers.
 The classical case under this approach was first presented by Mundell (1961). Consider
an autonomous shift in aggregate demand which reduces the demand for the products of one
region  and raises the demand for  the products of the other region. If each region had its own
currency and the exchange rate was flexible, the decline in income in the first region would cause
its  currency to depreciate. Sticky prices imply that this would cause the relative price of its products
to fall both at home and in the other region. The result would be an increase in domestic and export
demand which would partly offset the initial demand shock. Thus, exchange rate adjustment
contributes to stabilizing the economies in both regions.
If  the two regions share the same currency, other mechanisms for adjustment must play
this role. While the required relative price adjustment could still work through output price and wage
adjustments, prices and wages do not seem sufficiently flexible in practice.
5  This leaves factor
movements, and movements of labor in particular as alternative market adjustment mechanisms.
66
As workers move from the first to the second region, full employment output would adjust to the
shift in demand. 
If labor markets do not provide sufficient adjustments either, fiscal transfers between the
two regions can do the job. Specifically, taxing the prosperous region and paying the proceeds to
the region in distress restores aggregate demand there and reduces aggregate demand in the
former region. The same result can be obtained by increasing central government spending in the
depressed region and reducing it in the prospering region. 
Regarding fiscal transfers as a substitute for nominal exchange rate adjustment has an
important implication. The literature generally agrees that nominal exchange rate flexibility
accelerates economic adjustment to asymmetric shocks, but it is not a necessary condition for
adjustment in the long run. Even if prices and wages are sticky and labor migration is slow, regional
markets sharing the same currency should eventually adjust to asymmetric shocks. This suggests
that fiscal transfers offsetting temporary asymmetric shocks are more important to secure the
viability of a monetary union than transfers tied to permanent shocks. The resulting limitation of
intranational risksharing to temporary shocks seems much less natural under the consumption-
smoothing approach where insurance against both temporary and permanent shocks is considered.
Fiscal transfers offsetting temporary asymmetric shocks between regions can obviously be
carried out in a fully discretionary, case-by-case manner. Mundell’s analysis bears little relation to
intranational insurance per se, if insurance is understood to imply an ex ante guarantee that
transfers be paid when asymmetric shocks occur. However, constitutional rules ensuring transfer
payments between regions or the existence of a central budget providing for appropriate transfers
can give assurance to all regions involved that payments will be executed should they be hit by
adverse shocks in the future. Such assurance may be important to make the promise of paying
transfers to regions in distress credible. The literature on EMU (Delors, 1989; Wyplosz, 1991;
Pisani-Ferry et al, 1993) has emphasized the importance of credible promises of fiscal transfers
for a country’s willingness to surrender its monetary autonomy.7
II.3. Mutual Insurance versus Self-Insurance
In principle, regional governments can self-insure their regions against transitory shocks by
borrowing and lending in the national or international capital market. In our example above, the
depressed region’s government could borrow and spend the proceeds on domestic output, while
the prospering region’s government would invest its higher tax revenues in national or international
assets. Since the issue is insurance against transitory shocks, a region’s borrowing and lending
would be zero on average over long time horizons. Thus, no fiscal mechanism spanning across
regions would be required.
However, self-insurance of this kind requires that regions in distress have access to the
capital market. In the presence of credit rationing, this may not be the case. Self-insurance then
requires that a region’s net position in the capital market is never negative, which demands the
accumulation of  a sufficiently large capital fund over time. The cost of this fund in terms of
consumption foregone makes self-insurance less attractive than intranational insurance. Regions,
particularly if they are small, may also face higher borrowing rates than lending rates in the market.
If so, the average cost of self-insurance is positive even if the average level of borrowing is zero,
and the cost is larger, the larger the variance of the shocks insured. Capital market imperfections
are thus important to justify the preference for intranational insurance.    
Bayoumi and Masson (1997, 1998) point to another advantage of intranational insurance.
Self-insurance implies that increased government spending during a recession is matched by a
future tax liability. Rational, forward-looking consumers anticipate the future tax payments and
reduce consumption accordingly. Under intranational insurance, in contrast, transfers paid to a
depressed region do not increase that region’s expected future tax liabilities, if the expected value
of future asymmetric shocks is zero and the insurance scheme is balanced across regions. Under
these assumptions, intranational insurance is a more effective tool of regional stabilization.
Interestingly, Bayoumi and Masson report evidence from Canada suggesting that the demand
effect of payments to provinces resulting from intranational insurance is positive and significant,
while debt-financed central government transfers to the provinces have no significant demand7von Hagen (1993), van der Ploeg (1991), Wyplosz (1991), Goodhart and Smith
(1993) all warn of the potential moral hazard risk involved in interregional insurance in a
European Monetary Union. Courchene (1993) points to the example of Quebec which
maintained a higher minimum wage than other Canadian provinces in the 1970s and was
able to shift the cost of higher unemployment in bad times on to the federal budget.
8
effects.  
II.4. Moral Hazard Problems
Like all kinds of insurance, intranational insurance is plagued with moral hazard problems.
7
Moral hazard problems arising in the context of unemployment insurance and other welfare
programs are well understood and need no elaboration in our context, though intranational
insurance based on such mechanisms obviously suffers from the same problems. In our more
special context, two specific aspects of moral hazard deserve attention.
One regards the incentive of regional governments participating in intranational insurance
to invest in risk-avoidance strategies. Persson and Tabellini (1996a) show that a government’s
incentive to raise local taxes and spend the proceeds on projects that make negative asymmetric
shocks less likely in the home region is reduced by the prospect of transfers from other regions
when such shocks hit. With decentralized policies geared at risk-avoidance, local governments
invest too little in such activities. The implication is that investment in risk-avoidance strategies
should not be left uncoordinated between the regional governments. A central government
providing intranational insurance will find it preferable to centralize policies aiming at risk-avoidance
or to subsidize investment in such strategies by the regional governments in order to increase the
level of their investment. Thus, moral hazard creates an “incentive complementarity” (Persson and
Tabellini, 1996b), in the sense that making intranational insurance a central government program
raises the incentive to create further central government programs related to regional risk.
The other moral hazard problem regards the effectiveness of market mechanisms for
adjustment to transitory, asymmetric shocks. Migué (1993) argues that, since taxes and transfers
are generally distortive in practice, redistributive policies reduce the incentive for private individuals
to adjust to regional shocks. Here, it is particularly important to go beyond Mundell’s example and9
consider supply shocks.  Individuals who receive transfer incomes from the central government
when their region fares badly, may see less reason to accept wage cuts, to move into other
industries or to move into other regions. The implication is that central-government provided
intranational insurance can reduce the effectiveness of market mechanisms for adjustment.
Obstfeld and Peri (1998) discuss one important example for this, namely labor market
adjustment to regional, asymmetric shocks. They show that regional differences in unemployment
rates are much more persistent within European states than within the US, and that interregional
migration within European states contributes much less to the adjustment to asymmetric shocks
than it does in the US. Since cultural and language barriers, which are often referred to explain the
slow labor market adjustment across European states, do not exist within these states, but fiscal
transfers paid in response to asymmetric shocks are much larger in European states than in the
US, Obstfeld and Peri interpret this observation as showing that the generous welfare programs
in Europe reduce the incentive for workers to move in response to economic shocks. In doing so,
European transfer programs reduce the effectiveness of labor market adjustment.
While the logic of the argument is compelling, interpretating the evidence is difficult, as the
causality might be reversed. Countries where markets adjust sluggishly for whatever reason would
likely choose higher levels of intranational insurance. Still, the theoretical arguments and the
empirical evidence suggest that full intranational insurance is unlikely to be desirable, and that the
choice of an efficient level of intranational insurance is a complicated matter, even more so when
intranational insurance is a byproduct of a central government budget or welfare system. 
II.5. Political Economy Aspects
Existing mechanisms of intranational risksharing are the product of political choices. The
design and size of such programs are, therefore, likely to depend on the political processes by
which they are chosen. Persson and Tabellini (1996a,b) present models of federations and federal
states analyzing this dependence. In their analysis, federations rely on intergovernmental transfers,
while federations implement intranational insurance on the basis of federal government programs.10
In Persson and Tabellini’s analysis, regions are exposed to uncorrelated regional income
shocks which give rise to risk pooling, but which have different risk characteristics. In particular, a
region can be “riskier” than others in the sense that it is more often hit by adverse economic
shocks. As explained in section II.1., efficient intranational risksharing under such circumstances
involves full insurance but requires that a “riskier” region pays a risk premium to the less risky ones.
To facilitate this, the insurance must combine state-dependent with state-independent transfer
payments, where the latter represent the risk premium. But the existence of state-independent
transfers implies a scope for permanent redistribution between regions and creates a source of
conflict between citizens of the different regions.
 Persson and Tabellini (1996b) show that full insurance combined with the efficient risk
premium can be obtained when the intergovernmental transfers are the result of a Nash bargain
(or unanimity vote) among the representative agents from each region. In contrast, majority voting
in each region separately does not sustain a voting equilibrium with efficient intranational insurance.
Moreover, a voting equilibrium in which all regions decide separately on the same combination of
state-dependent and state-independent transfers does not exist, since voters in each region will
try to exploit the state-independent tax to extract permanent redistribution in their favor from the
other regions. With separate votes in all regions, a voting equilibrium can only be reached if the
insurance mechanism is limited to state-dependent transfers, and this produces an undersupply
of intranational insurance. One interpretation of this is that intranational insurance should be
decided at the constitutional design stage of a federation, i.e., be the result of negotiations between
the representatives of the regions and subject to a ratification requirement in each region. 
If intranational risksharing is provided by a federal program targeting individuals rather than
regions and voted in federal referenda in which citizens of all regions take part, Persson and
Tabellini show that the efficient intranational insurance can be obtained in a majority vote if all
regions have the same risk properties. With different degrees of riskiness, majority voting leads
again to inefficiencies. If voters are subject to other kinds of risk in addition to regional income risk,
the federal referendum can facilitate the formation coalitions across regional borders allowing11
voters to exploit intranational insurance against the latter to insure themselves against other types
of risk. As intranational risksharing becomes intertwined with other purposes, such coalitions will
vote for too much of it.  
III. Empirical Evidence
III.1. Market Adjustment to Asymmetric Shocks in the US
The debate over European monetary integration in the last decade has produced numerous
empirical studies of intranational insurance in the US and elsewhere. Most of these studies have
focused on the fiscal transfer mechanisms involved. Intranational insurance provided through
capital markets is much harder to estimate due to data problems. Only a few studies exist for the
US. Atkeson and Bayoumi (1993) use state data from 1966 to 1986 to estimate the extent to which
state incomes are insured against state-specific risks through US capital markets. They do this by
regressing changes in per-capita incomes earned from capital located in a state on changes in per-
capita incomes earned from capital located in the rest of the country, state labor incomes and state
capital products. Their estimate suggest that state capital incomes are mainly driven by incomes
earned from capital located in the rest of the country, and that a decline in state labor incomes is
offset by a small but significant increase in capital incomes. Thus, asset markets provide significant
but little intranational insurance. The strong correlation between state consumption (proxied by
retail sales) and state incomes suggests also that intranational insurance is far from perfect.
Asdrubali et al (1996) provide a more elaborate study of income smoothing across states.
The model they estimate is directly derived from accounting relations and, therefore, involves no
further assumptions about consumer choices as Atkeson and Bayoumi’s analysis does. Using data
from 1964 to 1990, their estimates suggest that capital markets smooth 39 percent of cross-state
fluctuations in gross state product, and that credit markets smooth another 23 percent of these
fluctuations. This gives financial markets a much larger role in consumption smoothing than
Atkeson and Bayoumi’s results do. The more direct method of estimation lends more credibility to
their results. Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (1998), who estimate the reduction of the standard12




von Hagen 47 10
Atkeson, Bayoumi  7
Goodhart, Smith 15 13
Pisani-Ferry et al. 17
Gros, Jones  4-14 
Bayoumi, Masson  7-22 7-30 
Mélitz, Zumer  16 12-20 
Asdrubali et al.  13 
Sorensen, Yosha 15
Fatas  11 
Obstfeld, Peri 19 10
Athanasoulis, van
Wincorp
20 10  
Note: Entries indicate the estimated (range of) net federal
transfers received by a region in response to a 1-dollar
difference in the level or change in state income or product
compared to US average income or product.
Table 1: Estimates of Federal Intranational 
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deviation of state income due to financial markets at different time horizons, find that financial
markets smooth about thirty percent of shocks to gross state products at horizons of 1-2 years, and
35 percent on average over up to 26 years. 
III.2. Intranational Insurance through the US Federal Fiscal System
Turning to intranational
insurance provided by the federal
fiscal system, recent literature has
provided a large number of
estimates, summarized in Table 1.
The numbers indicate the
estimated increase, measured in
cents, in  the net transfers received
by a state or region in response to
a one-dollar decline of the state’s
or region’s income relative to US
average. 
The MacDougall Report
looked at the issue of intranational
insurance by asking to what extent
does the federal fiscal system
reduce income differences
between US states. The same
question is asked in Sachs and
Sala-i-Martin, who consider the following regression for an answer:13
)ln(taxit) ’ "t % $)ln(Yit) % Dummies % residual . (4)
where “taxit ” denotes the taxes paid by region i to the federal government in period t, “taxt “ is the
national aggregate of taxit, Yit is personal income in region i and year t, and Yt is the national
aggregate of Yt. Sachs and Sala-i-Martin run a similar regression with transfers as the dependent
variable. They consider the nine US census regions as geographical units.
Sachs and Sala-i-Martin interpret the coefficient $ as a measure of the offsetting effect of
the federal fiscal system to region-specific income shocks. Estimating the combined effect of taxes
and transfers at 33 - 40 cents to the dollar, they conclude that the federal fiscal system provides
very substantial insurance against asymmetric regional shocks, a conclusion that conforms with the
MacDougall Report. 
But this conclusion is unwarranted. As von Hagen (1992) first pointed out, equation (3)
shows by how much the tax liabilities and transfer benefits of a region are reduced or increased
relative to the national average, if its income is larger or smaller than the national average by a
given amount, without making a distinction between permanent and transitory income differences.
Thus, equation (3), like the MacDougall Report, lumps together two very different things provided
by a federal fiscal system, namely permanent redistribution to reduce secular income differences
between regions, and insurance against asymmetric shocks. von Hagen (1992) proposes to get
a better estimate of the second issue by running Sachs’ and Sala-i-Martin’s regression in first
differences:
Rather than estimating a trend, von Hagen allows the intercepts of his panel regression to vary and
account for the US business cycle. The dummies are for the oil-producing states. von Hagen uses
state gross products as the explanatory variable. As Table 1 shows, the insurance effect thus
obtained is substantially lower than the Sachs and Sala-i-Martin estimate, while the redistributive
effect is about the same.
Subsequent papers have generally accepted the distinction between redistribution and
insurance or regional stabilization and come out with estimates that are closer to von Hagen’s8More specifically, Fatas (1998)  notes that a necessary condition for intranational
insurance is that the correlation between shocks at the state level and shocks at the
national level is less than one. Empirically, he finds that the average correlation coefficient
between state and aggregate US annual real income growth rates is 0.72.
14
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(1992) results. Bayoumi and Masson’s (1995) study, who estimate the insurance effect based on
the following regression,
stands out among the later estimates for a relatively high insurance coefficient (see Table 1). But
this may be due to a second distinction between this and Sachs and Sala-i-Martin’s regression and
von Hagen’s, discussed more elaborately by Fatas (1998). This is that an increase in the net
transfers received by a state may be financed either by a reduction of the net transfers received
by all others, which corresponds to intranational insurance, or by an increase in the federal budget
deficit, in which case the federal government implicitly undertakes the borrowing on behalf of that
state. Neither Sachs and Sala-i-Martin nor Bayoumi and Masson (1995) distinguish between these
two possibilities, while the time-varying intercepts in von Hagen’s regression can be interpreted to
do just that implicitly.
8 Fatas (1998) shows that accounting for this distinction properly reduces the
insurance effect implied by the Sachs and Sala-i-Martin estimate to about 10 cents on a dollar
change in relative income.
Mélitz and Zumer (1997) compare estimates based on state income and estimates based
on gross state products as the measure of regional economic activity. They find that the insurance
effect associated with gross-state-product estimates tends to be lower than the effect associated
with state-income estimates. Conceptually this raises the difficulty that state incomes include
incomes earned from economic activities outside the state. Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (1998)
estimate the stabilizing role of the federal fiscal system at time horizons of different lengths. They
find that the federal fiscal system reduces the standard deviation of changes in state incomes by
about ten percent at an horizon of 1-2 years, and by 15 percent on average over all horizons.  15
The study of Pisani-Ferry et al. (1993) stands out in this group for its very different
methodology. These authors use a macroeconomic simulation model augmented by a model of
budgetary flows within a country based on government accounting relations to assess the tax and
transfer effects of asymmetric regional shocks. Despite their different methodology, however, their
estimate for the US is similar to most of the post-Sachs and Sala-i-Martin literature.
 In sum, the empirical studies of the 1990s confirm that there is a significant intranational
insurance provided by the federal fiscal system in the US. While there is still some disagreement
about the size of the insurance, the empirical evidence clearly suggests that such insurance is of
much smaller magnitude than the redistributive effect of the federal fiscal system, and that the
insurance does not offset much more than 10 cents on a dollar change in state income caused by
an asymmetric shock. 
III.3. Intranational Insurance in Other States
Several studies have presented similar estimates for countries other than the US. Table 2
summarizes these results. Canada is an obvious study object in the context of EMU; it was included
also in the MacDougall Report. It is of particular interest, because Canada has an explicit,
constitutionally grounded mechanism for horizontal transfers among the provinces, the Canadian
Equalization System. Equalization aims at reducing differences in the standards of living between
Canadian provinces by compensating the poorer provinces for their less prosperous tax bases.
According to Canadian legal tradition, equalization is an outflow of the principle of equality of all
citizens before the law.
  The MacDougall Report estimated that the Canadian federal system reduces income
differences between provinces by 32 cents per dollar. Bayoumi and Masson, based on the
regression equation (5), estimate an insurance of 14 cents to the dollar, less than their estimate
for the US and put the redistributive effect of the Canadian system at 39 cents to the dollar.  Other
studies agree with the magnitude of the intranational insurance in Canada, but provide more16
different estimates of the redistributive effect.
One difficulty with the Canadian equalization system is that it is designed to bring  relatively
poor provinces up to a standard defined by the average per capita revenues of Ontario, British
Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Quebec (Courchene, 1997). Under the rules of the
system, Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario do not receive equalization payments at all, the
remaining provinces that are included in the standard receive a partial offset for a revenue short
fall, and those not included in the
standard receive full offset for a
decline in revenues. At the same
time, a poor province receives a
transfer when revenues in the
provinces included in the standard
increase, even if the economy of
that province performs like the
Canadian average. This shows the
emphasis on redistribution rather
than intranational insurance, and
implies that regressions like
equation (5) employed by Bayoumi
and Masson and Mélitz and Zumer
are likely to misrepresent the
working of the system.
Recent literature has also
evaluated intranational insurance in
France, Germany, Italy, and the
UK. The results show a surprising





Goodhart, Smith 12 - 19
Mélitz/Zumer 18 14
Obstfeld, Peri 53 13
France
MacDougall 54




Pisani-Ferry et al. 34-42
Italy
MacDougall 47
Obstfeld, Peri 8 3
UK
Goodhart, Smith 21
Mélitz/Zumer 29 21  
Note: Entries indicate the estimated (range of) net federal
transfers received by a region in response to a 1-dollar
difference in the level or change in state income or product
compared to US average income or product.
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countries. Mélitz and Zumer and Goodhart and Smith obtain similar estimates for the UK, where
intranational insurance seems somewhat larger than in Canada and the US. Mélitz and Zumer find
that intranational insurance is substantially larger in France than in the North America. This result
is confirmed by Pisani-Ferry et al. (1993) despite their different methodology. While this might
suggest that insurance is generally larger in unitary states than in federations, Obstfeld and Peri
(1998) estimate that intranational insurance is tiny in Italy. Pisani-Ferry et al (1993) find that
intranational insurance in Germany is as large as in France. Thus, the existing evidence allows no
clear-cut conclusions about the importance of intranational insurance in federal compared to unitary
states.  
In sum, the empirical evidence shows that intranational insurance is a significant part of
intranational macroeconomics. But the size of the insurance can be very different in different
countries, and there is no empirical evidence to answer the question how important it is in practice
for the stabilization of the regional economies. 
III.4. Intranational Insurance in Europe?
Several studies have recently explored the prospects for fiscal insurance among the
countries participating in the future European Monetary Union. Mélitz and Vori (1993) explore the
insurability of shocks to the national economies of the European states by estimating their
correlations across states. For real incomes, they find that the correlations are positive and large
for all EU states except the U.K., Denmark, and Ireland. Since only the latter will be a member of
the monetary union, the scope for intra-EMU insurance would be small. Even less scope for
insurance is found when the transfers are tied to unemployment rather than real income figures.
Fatas (1998) reports a similar result and concludes that nothing much is lost if the European
Monetary Union operates without a fiscal insurance mechanism.
von Hagen and Hammond (1997, 1998) evaluate the hypothetical performance of intra-EMU
insurance mechanisms against regional shocks. They construct time series of asymmetric shocks
from historical data and simulate the transfer mechanism under various assumptions about the18
properties of the shocks and the design of the system. Their main focus is on the robustness of the
system against changes in the simulation parameters. The results suggest that a satisfactory
insurance mechanism against asymmetric shocks can be designed, but that the system would have
to be based on very complicated and hence unrealistic formulae to compute the appropriate
transfers. Importantly, von Hagen and Hammond find that the quality of the system’s performance
deteriorates radically with even small changes in the assumptions about the properties of the
shocks. Given the complexity of the design, the implication is that the probability of a misdesign is
high and the resulting damage considerable.
 IV. The Macroeconomics of Intranational Risk-sharing
The literature discussed so far takes the desirability of intranational risk-sharing for the
stabilization of regional economies for granted and assumes that there is no conflict between
intranational risk-sharing and stabilizing a nation’s  aggregate economy. In this section, we turn to
the macroeconomics of intranational risk-sharing and look at these questions more closely.
Conforming with the literature, we assume that intranational risk-sharing is a rules-based approach
aiming at reducing income differences between regions through interregional taxes and transfers.
In the appendix, we develop a model of regional macroeconomic stabilization for a country
consisting of two regions. A central ingredient of this model is its neo-keynesian flavor, i.e., the
assumption that prices and wages are sticky, which allows aggregate demand to have short-run
real effects. While one may debate the validity of these keynesian assumptions in principle, they
are clearly appropriate for discussing the issue of regional stabilization policy, which is void if
aggregate demand policies have no real effects at all. Furthermore, we assume that the two
regions have heterogeneous economic structures in the sense that the aggregate demand effect
of government spending and the real interest rate elasticities of aggregate demand are different
in the two regions. This structural heterogeneity is of key importance for the analysis. Empirically,
it is validated by the fact that structural parameters can vary substantially across countries in
structural multi-country models, and the observation that monetary policy shocks affect different9 For empirical evidence on these issues see von Hagen and Waller (forthcoming).
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regions in different ways in existing monetary unions.
9 The two regions in our model  produce
outputs which are imperfect substitutes in demand. Both are affected by demand and supply (wage
and productivity) shocks. 
Regional fiscal policy, represented in the model by regional government spending, is able,
in principle, to offset the effects of relative demand and supply shocks perfectly in this economy.
This, however, requires that the individual  shocks can be identified and observed as they occur,
and that the regional governments coordinate their fiscal policies very closely. Both requirements
seem unrealistic in practice, making discretionary fiscal policy unfit for regional insurance against
relative income shocks.  
IV.1. Intranational Risk-sharing and Regional Stabilization
We consider a transfer mechanism between the two regions that aims at reducing income
differentials between the two regions,
The parameter " indicates the degree of insurance, the larger it is, the more closely the regional
incomes are tied to national average income. We ask how such a mechanism affects output and
prices in the home region in the presence of purely asymmetric shocks. Equations (A5) and (A6)
provide the basis for an answer. 
Consider, first, the case of a relative demand shock which shifts demand from the home
region to the foreign region. Home output falls and so does the regional output price. In the
absence of fiscal transfers, this real exchange rate depreciation helps the home region recover
partly from the initial shock, the more so, the larger the relative price elasticity of demand. If the
latter is taken as a measure of economic integration, asymmetric shocks matter less when the
regions are highly integrated. 10See Holzmann and Herve (1998), who discuss this case in the context of the
classical “transfer problem” of international economics.
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With symmetric output effects of a fiscal impulse in the two regions, the transfer from the
foreign to the home region unambiguously stabilizes both output and prices in the home region.
However, if the output effect of a fiscal impulse is larger in the foreign region than in the home
region,, the transfer scheme can be counterproductive in the sense that it weakens the economy’s
self-stabilizing capacity. The reason is that the transfer paid by the foreign region reduces demand
there by more than the initial shift in autonomous demand increased it, thus lowering the foreign
region’s import demand for domestic output. In this case, therefore, home output would be more
stable in the absence of a fiscal transfer mechanism.   
Consider next the case of a negative relative wage or productivity shock. As before, the
fiscal transfer mechanism stabilizes home output unless the impact of government spending of
foreign aggregate demand is too large. However, the transfer scheme amplifies the response of
the home output price. The reason is straightforward. The transfer increases demand for the home
product in a situation where output is down and prices are already rising due to the supply shock.
The desirability of a fiscal stabilization mechanism depends, therefore, on the relative size of the
price effect and the relative weight of regional price stability in the utility function of the residents
of the region. Clearly, when output is inelastic to price changes, the transfer mechanism only raises
inflation in the home region and is entirely undesirable.
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IV.2. Intranational Risk-sharing and National Stabilization
Next, we turn to the implications of the regional stabilization mechanism for aggregate
output and price level fluctuations. Equation (A7) in the appendix demonstrates that regional
asymmetries in the response of aggregate demand to a fiscal impulse imply that the fiscal transfer
mechanism translates purely relative into aggregate fluctuations. The reason is that the transfer
lowers (raises) demand in one region by less than it raises (lowers) demand in the other, raising
national aggregate demand as a result. In the presence of such asymmetries, the transfer scheme21
can, therefore, create a conflict between stabilization policy at the national level and stabilization
of the regional economies. For example, a central bank firmly committed to price stability would be
enticed to raise interest rates, if the regional stabilization scheme causes aggregate demand to rise
following a relative demand or supply shock between the two regions The monetary restriction
would obviously aggravate the recession in the region affected by a negative shock. Thus, in the
presence of asymmetric regional responses to fiscal stimuli, the regional transfer mechanism can
intensify conflicts between the national monetary and fiscal authorities.
These results were derived assuming equal interest rate elasticities of aggregate demand
in the two regions. Releasing that restriction turns the attention to asymmetric reactions to the
aggregate shock in the two regions, including asymmetric responses to the common monetary
policy. As the income differential now depends on the size of the aggregate shock (see equ. A8)
, the transfer mechanism triggers income flows between the regions in response to aggregate
shocks. For example, if a monetary contraction affects output demand in the home region more
than elsewhere, the impact effect will be a greater recession in this area, which makes the home
region receive transfers from the other region. As shown in the appendix, the regional stabilization
mechanism can increase or reduce the the effect of an aggregate shock on aggregate income,
depending on the relative size of the regional responses to a fiscal impulse. Thus, in the presence
of asymmetries in the regional propagation mechanisms of aggregate shocks and fiscal policy,
intranational risksharing can reduce or improve the effectiveness of monetary policy.
V. Conclusions
Intranational risksharing through a nation’s tax and transfer system is a fundamental aspect
of the fiscal system of developed economies. It can be justified generally by the desire of
consumers to smooth consumption over time, and by the desire to stabilize regional output and
employment in the absence of exchange rate flexibility between regions. Moral hazard problems
and political economy considerations, however, suggest that full risksharing among regions of22
asymmetric shocks is not optimal. 
The empirical evidence available for a number of countries shows that intranational risk-
sharing through the fiscal system is significant in all countries. However, there is a large degree of
variation in the size of the intranational insurance provided by the tax and transfer system. In the
US, as in most countries for which empirical evidence existr, the actual risksharing seems to be
rather modest. The empirical literature shows that the distinction between redistribution and
insurance or stabilization is crucial in the proper estimation. Surprisingly perhaps, there is no clear
evidence that intranational risksharing is larger in unitary than in federal states. Existing research
gives no basis for explaining why countries chose the degree of intranational risksharing they have,
and for judging whether the observed degree of risksharing is close to the optimal one.
An important aspect of tax and transfer-based intranational risksharing is that payments
cannot be implemented to offset regional shocks directly, since the shocks are not directly
observed in practice.  Thus, practical implementation of intranational risksharing  must rely on rules
tying payments to income differentials. Such transfers, however, can increase the variability of
regional output and prices, and interfere with the stabilization of the national economy. Interference
between regional and national stabilization may be one reason why we do not observe more
intranational risk-sharing through the fiscal system in large federations such as Canada and the
US.
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Appendix: A Neo-keynesian Model of Regional Stabilization and Risksharing11 The aggregate shock is E  = N(a+a*+g+g*-6(1+2N)(w+w
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We consider a “country” consisting of two regions, the home region and the foreign region. A “*”
denotes variables of the foreign region. Let y
 be output, p the output price, r the nominal interest rate, which
is common to both regions, m the country’s money supply, and g the fiscal impulse. All variables denote
relative deviations from steady state.   Output demand in the two regions is
Here , B
e denotes the expected national rate of inflation, a and a
* shocks to the levels of demand, and p
* - p
is the real exchange rate of the home region. With c
*￿c and f
* ￿ 1 we allow for some asymmetry in the
propagation mechanisms of the two regions. Output supply is characterized by price-setting functions
where w  is a nominal wage shock and 2 is a productivity shock. Money market equilibrium is given by the
condition
For now, we assume that c
*=c.  Assuming that all current shocks are transitory, we have inflation
expectations B
e = - E - 0.5((y+y
*) . Taking this into account yields the equilibium solutions
where N=(d+.5c)( and 6=c(b-.5), and where E  is the aggregate shock common to both regions and D is the
differential shock
11.
Consider now the transfer mechanism defined in equation (6). Calculating the equilibrium solutions
yields
where ’=1+2(2+()bc. The equilibrium solution for the home region’s output price level is12 This is  the case, if f
* > (1+N+bc(2+())/(N-bc(2+()) > 1.
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Consider first the case of a relative demand shock, a < 0. With 0 < f
* # 1, the fiscal transfer
mechanism is unambiguously stabilizing both output and prices in the home region. However, if f
*>1, a fiscal
transfer scheme weakens the economy’s self-stabilizing capacity.
12  
Consider next the case of a negative relative supply shock to the home region, w > 0 or 2 > 0. Output
is stabilized unless f
* is again too large. The response of the output price of the home region, however, is
increased by such a mechanism.
Aggregate, national output and prices are: 
With f
* ￿ 1, the fiscal transfer mechanism translates purely relative into aggregate fluctuations.
To study the implications of asymmetric interest elasticities of aggregate demand, we simplify the
analysis and  set all asymmetric shocks to zero, i.e., a=a
*, w=w
*, and 2=2
*, implying that D=0. Furthermore,
we  let  d=0. Assuming f
* = 1, this yields 
for the income differential. Thus, aggregate shocks, including monetary policy shocks affect income in the
two regions in different ways. With asymmetric effects of fiscal policy in the two regions, the transfer scheme
can reduce or amplify the impact of aggregate shocks on the two region’s combined incomes, which, in this
case is 
where . = c/c
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